State v. Poppe Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 43569 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-9-2016
State v. Poppe Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43569
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Poppe Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43569" (2016). Not Reported. 2789.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2789
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO




     vs. )
)
   JOSHUA C. POPPE, )
)
Defendant/Appellant. )
                                                                      )
Supreme Court No. 43569-2015
Canyon County District Court 
Case No. CR- 2015-0001452-C
                                                                        
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
                                                                        
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY
OF CANYON
                                                                        
HONORABLE MOLLEY J HUSKEY
District Judge
                                                                        
   ROBYN FYFFE
   Fyffe Law
   800 W. Main St., Ste. 1460
   P.O. Box 5681
   Boise, Idaho 83705 
   Telephone: (208) 338-5231
   robyn@fyffelaw.com
   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
JESSICA LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  
I. Table of Authorities  ii ............................................................................................
II. Argument in Reply 1 ...............................................................................................
 A. The Officer’s Several Minute Interrogation Regarding Josh’s Nervousness and 
Drugs Measurably Extended the Stop’s Duration 2 ..............................................
 B. No Reasonable Suspicion Justified Expanding the Detention’s 
Scope……………………………………………………………………………5 
 C. The Dog Sniff Prolonged the Detention…………………………………..7 
 D. Even if the Detention and Dog Sniff Were Lawful, the Cocaine’s 
Discovery Cannot Be Justified as a Search Incident to a Hypothetical 
Arrest for Misdemeanor Possession of Marijuana and  
  Paraphernalia………………………………………………………………8 
  
III. Conclusion  11.......................................................................................................
i
I.  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  
FEDERAL CASES  
Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.2001)…………………………………5 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)……………………………………………..…….9 
United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir.1998)…………..……………….5 
United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2014)………………………………9, 10 
United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 2015)…………………………………….8 
United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874 (10th Cir.1994)……………………….5 
United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th Cir.1997)…………………………….5 
STATE CASES  
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 108 P.3d 424(Ct. App. 2005)
…………………………………………………………………………………  5 
State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 362 P.3d 551 (Ct. App. 2015)……….………..3, 8 
State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 352 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2015)  
……………………………………………………………………………………9 
State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 146 P.3d 697(Ct. App. 2006)……………….……5
!ii
 II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The district court found reasonable suspicion to justify a drug investigation 
based on the officer’s observations that Appellant Josh Poppe and his passenger 
(Magdaline) were nervous and fidgety, that Josh’s hands were shaking and that he 
refused to make eye contact. On appeal, the state does not defend this finding and, 
instead, argues that interrogating Josh was appropriate because it did not 
measurably extend the stop and was consistent with its underlying mission.  
However, the officer delayed returning to the patrol vehicle to contact dispatch in 
favor of confronting Josh for several minutes about his nervousness and the 
presence of drugs in the vehicle. In so doing, the officer abandoned the stop’s 
purpose and initiated a drug investigation unsupported by reasonable suspicion. 
This Court should therefore reverse the district court’s order denying Josh’s motion 
to suppress and remand to allow Josh to withdraw his pleas of guilty. 
Even if the drug dog’s alert occurred during a lawful detention, it did not 
justify searching Josh for contraband. Nor did the state present evidence that Josh 
would have “inevitably” been arrested for misdemeanor possession of marijuana and 
paraphernalia. Instead, the record establishes that Josh probably would have been 
cited and released, like his passenger, but for the cocaine’s unlawful discovery. This 
Court should vacate the order withholding judgment. 
!  1
A. The Officer’s Several Minute Interrogation Regarding Josh’s   
 Nervousness and Drugs Measurably Extended the Stop’s Duration 
 The video recording from the camera mounted on the officer’s patrol car 
reveals the officer speaking with Josh and Magdaline at the vehicle’s window for a 
couple minutes before directing Josh to exit while leaving Magdaline alone in her 
vehicle. Exhibit A, 3:08:10 – 3:08:30. After frisking Josh, the officer confronted him 
regarding his nervousness and interrogated him about drugs in the vehicle, his past 
drug use and his criminal history.  Id. at 3:08:30–3:10:05. Josh denied there were 
drugs or other weapons in the vehicle. Id. at 3:10:05-3:10:36  
 Four to five minutes after stopping the vehicle, the canine handler arrived. 
Exhibit A, 3:10:25. The first officer directed the canine officer to “ask [Magdaline] 
out of the vehicle, and kind of get a feel for what was going on.” PH Tr. p. 11, ln, 
13-16. The first officer continued to question Josh about drug use and any drugs in 
the vehicle and Josh continued to deny there were drugs or other contraband in the 
vehicle. Exhibit A, 3:10:25-3:11:30.  The officer told Josh that “now” was his 
opportunity to be honest as the officer interrogating Magdaline had a drug dog and 
continued to ask whether there were drugs in the vehicle, which Josh continued to 
deny. Id. at 3:11:30-3:12:20. A third officer arrived on the scene and Josh stood with 
him as the first officer conferred with the canine handler. Id. at 3:12:30-3:13:22.  
 Finally, at about eight minutes into the stop, the officer returned to his patrol 
vehicle and provided dispatch with Josh and Magdaline’s information. Exhibit A, 
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3:13:26-3:14:38. The state cites to State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 480, 362 P.3d 551, 
555 (Ct. App. 2015) for the proposition that general questioning on topics including 
nervousness are permissible unless they measurably extend the stop’s duration. 
Respondent’s Brief, p. 9, 11-12. In Hays, however, the Court of Appeals held that 
the forty-three second discussion into the driver’s nervousness related to officer 
and highway safety and did not measurably extend the stop’s duration. Such brief 
questioning is certainly distinguishable from the officer’s several minute 
interrogation of Josh. 
 It is not the subjects of the officer questions (nervousness, criminal history or 
drugs in the vehicle) but their duration that are issue in this appeal.  The officer’s 
questioning, which resulted in a several minute delay before he contacted dispatch 
to check for warrants and the validity of the Magdaline’s concealed weapon’s 
permit, measurably extended the stop’s duration without reasonable suspicion.   1
 The state also attempts to recast Josh’s argument as one challenging that the 
questioning took place outside the vehicle. Respondent’s Brief, p. 12-13. The officer’s 
several minute long interaction would have measurably extended the stop’s 
duration whether it took place inside or outside of the vehicle. Further, the frisk 
 The state questions whether Josh disputes that the officer’s “tasks” included 1
verifying the concealed weapons permit. Respondent’s Brief, 9 n.1. To the contrary, 
Josh argues the officer unlawfully expanded the stop’s scope and duration by failing 
to engage in any of these “tasks” until eight minutes into the stop when his drug 
investigation was well underway and the dog sniff was imminent.
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and the questioning’s confrontational nature along side the freeway increased its 
coerciveness and further distances the interaction from one involving a few 
incidental questions unrelated to the stop’s basis. 
And while an officer generally has the discretion to direct occupants to exit 
during a roadside detention, the officer’s decision to do so here did not address his 
stated safety concern emanating from the firearm in the vehicle. The passenger 
remained unsupervised in her vehicle with the handgun easily accessible under her 
seat while the officer frisked and interrogated Josh alongside the freeway.  
Had the officer truly been concerned about the firearm’s presence and 
whether it was lawfully possessed, he would have returned to the relative safety of 
his patrol vehicle where he could ask dispatch to verify the concealed weapon’s 
permit, check for warrants and conduct similar tasks while waiting for back up. 
Rather, the video recording establishes the officer attempted to secure Josh’s 
admission that there were drugs in the vehicle while waiting for the drug dog to 
arrive. 
The officer measurably extended the stop’s duration by interrogating Josh 
about his nervousness and drugs for several minutes before contacting dispatch. 
The district court erred in denying the motion to suppress and this Court should 
vacate and remand.  
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B. No Reasonable Suspicion Justified Expanding the Detention’s Scope  
  As noted in the Opening Brief, it is well established that nervous demeanor 
during a law enforcement encounter is of limited significance in establishing 
reasonable suspicion because people are commonly nervous when confronted with 
law enforcement regardless of criminal activity. See Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294, 
1302 (11th Cir.2001) (general observation of  nervousness, standing alone, cannot 
provide “reasonable suspicion”); United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1139 (8th Cir.
1998) (it “certainly cannot be deemed unusual for a motorist to exhibit signs of 
nervousness when confronted by a law enforcement officer”); United States v. 
Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879 (10th Cir.1994) (noting that the Court had repeatedly 
held that nervousness is of limited significance in determining reasonable 
suspicion); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir.1997) (nervousness is 
of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion and the government's 
repetitive reliance on nervousness as a basis for reasonable suspicion must be 
treated with caution).State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 435, 146 P.3d 697, 701 (Ct. 
App. 2006)(nervous demeanor during a law enforcement encounter is of limited 
significance in establishing reasonable suspicion because people are commonly 
nervous when confronted with law enforcement regardless of criminal activity); 
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 285–86, 108 P.3d 424, 432–33 (Ct.App.2005) (same). 
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 The state contends this principle does not apply to the case at bar because 
Josh “was lawfully detained pursuant to a traffic stop; he was not detained because 
of general ‘nervousness.’” Respondent’s Brief, p. 9. To the contrary, while Josh was 
initially detained for failing to signal a full five seconds before changing lanes, the 
detention’s scope was expanded due to his nervousness. This expansion required a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and nervousness is of limited 
significance in establishing such a suspicion.  
 According to the state, Josh’s “behavior, which included being ‘unusually 
nervous and fidgety,’ having trembling hands, and refusing to make eye contact, in 
conjunction with the presence of a gun in the car, was the appropriate subject of 
Trooper Sproat’s questioning during a properly initiated traffic stop.” Respondent’s 
Brief, p. 9. As discussed above, it is the officer’s unlawful expansion of the traffic 
stop’s duration, not the topics covered by the officer’s questions, that are it issue.  
 Trembling hands and refusing to make eye contact are just factors related to 
Josh’s nervous demeanor,  which is typical regardless of criminal activity. That 2
Magdaline identified herself with a concealed weapons permit and admitted having 
the handgun does not suggest criminal activity. And while the officer was certainly 
entitled to verify Magdaline’s permit, questioning Josh about his nervousness while 
leaving Magdaline’s alone with the gun failed to further that inquiry. 
 The officer did not suspect Josh was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.2
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The district court erred in finding that the officer possessed a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity that could justify expanding the traffic stop 
into a drug investigation. This Court should therefore vacate the Order Withholding 
Judgment.  
C. Actions Related to the Dog Sniff Prolonged the Detention  
The officer did not further his “mission” by calling dispatch to check the 
driver's license and concealed weapon’s permit and determine whether there are 
outstanding warrants until several minutes after the drug dog’s arrival and eight 
minutes after stopping the vehicle. The drug investigation and dog sniff 
substantially prolonged the detention beyond a reasonable amount of time to 
complete an investigation into the two traffic infractions.  
In arguing to the contrary, the state focuses on the timing of the drug dog’s  
alert, which occurred at roughly the same time as the dispatch return. Respondent’s 
Brief, p. 13-14. However, the timing of dispatch’s return was orchestrated by the 
officer, a member of the drug interdiction team, who had stopped a vehicle with 
Washington State plates for failing to signal for a full five seconds before changing 
lanes. See Tr. 12, ln. 4-21; PH Tr. p. 6, ln. 18 - p. 7, ln. 4. The officer immediately 
called for a drug dog, interrogated Josh about drugs until after the drug dog arrived 
and failed to contact dispatch for eight minutes.  If this Court concludes that the 
officer intentionally delayed contacting dispatch to ensure adequate time to 
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conclude the dog sniff, its inquiry is at an end. See Hays, 159 Idaho at 482, 362 P.3d 
at 557.  
Nor can the officer’s several minute questioning be justified as a “negligibly 
burdensome precaution” necessary to enable the officer to complete his mission 
safely. See also United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2015). In Evans, 
the Court found that the eight-minutes delay resulting from the officer’s decision to 
conduct an additional “ex-felon registration check” was “hardly negligible.” Id. The 
Court further found that the check “was inversely related to officer safety” since the 
officer would have been safer had he let the defendant go once he determined there 
was no reason to cite him for the traffic violations. Id. 
Similarly, the officer’s several minute interrogation was hardly “negligible” 
and, by leaving the passenger alone with the firearm rather than contacting 
dispatch, the questioning was “inversely” related to the officer’s safety during the 
stop. The officers’ questioning regarding drugs and other activities instead 
facilitated the dog sniff and prolonged the stop.  The district court erred in denying 
the motion to suppress.   
D. Even if the Detention and Dog Sniff  Were Lawful, the Cocaine’s 
Discovery Cannot Be Justified as a Search Incident to a Speculative 
Arrest for Misdemeanor Possession of Marijuana and Paraphernalia  
The district court found that the cocaine found on Josh’s person would have 
inevitably been discovered because the drug dog alert would have provided the 
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officers probable cause to arrest Josh for the misdemeanors. However, the 
inevitable discovery doctrine only applies if the government can establish that the 
unlawfully obtained information ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means by a preponderance of the evidence. Nix v. Williams, 
467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2014); 
State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 788, 352 P.3d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 2015).  
The state presented no such evidence in this case. Instead, the state contends 
that the inevitable discovery of evidence that could have theoretically supported the 
arrest (small amounts of marijuana and paraphernalia for which the passenger was 
cited and released) is one and the same as establishing that the arrest was 
inevitable. It is not.  
That is not to say that discovering evidence to justify an arrest would not 
establish that such an arrest was inevitable in other situations. In Rowland, police 
found methamphetamine on the defendant’s person while executing a search 
warrant at his residence. While searching the residence pursuant to the warrant, 
the officers discovered chainsaw parts with serial numbers corresponding to that of 
the stolen chainsaw described in the warrant, controlled substances and 
paraphernalia, including a digital scale. Rowland, 158 Idaho at 788, 352 P.3d at 
510. The Court held that the defendant “would certainly have been arrested as a 
result of the contraband found pursuant to the valid search warrant and then 
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searched incident to that arrest, making the discovery of the methamphetamine in 
his pocket inevitable.” Id. 
Unlike the serious felonies at issue in Rowland, there is no evidence Josh 
would have “certainly” been arrested for the misdemeanors. The only evidence in 
the record (the passenger’s release without an arrest for the same offenses)  3
supports the contrary conclusion.  
Similarly, in Camou, the Court held that the government failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have applied for a warrant to search 
the defendant’s phone for evidence of alien smuggling although there was arguably 
probable cause to support such a warrant. The government ultimately did not 
charge the defendant with alien smuggling and the prosecution had informed the 
Border Patrol the case did not meet prosecution guidelines.  “Because the 
reasonable conclusion from the record is that no search warrant would have been 
sought, the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is not satisfied.” 
Camou, 773 F.3d at 944  
Whether the officers would have inevitably had probable cause to charge Josh 
 The state notes that the officer testified that he released Magdaline to drive her 3
vehicle because it was hers. Respondent’s Brief, p. 17, n.2. This evidence does not 
distinguish Josh from Magdaline or otherwise support the conclusion that Josh 
would have been arrested for the misdemeanor offenses but for the cocaine’s 
unlawful discovery. Indeed, there is reason to doubt the state could have presented 
evidence that Josh would have been arrested for the misdemeanors. The incident 
occurred in Canyon County, where it is widely known that officers cite and release 
whenever possible to save very limited jail space for felony and violent offenses.
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for misdemeanor possession of marijuana and paraphernalia is not the same 
question as whether he would have inevitably been arrested (and thus searched) by 
a lawful means. The state presented no evidence suggesting that Josh would have 
been treated differently than his passenger and would have been arrested for the 
same offenses for which she was cited and released. 
 Contrary to the state’s argument that Josh’s argument “is predicated on his 
speculation” [Respondent’s Brief, p. 16], nothing but speculation supports the state’s 
contention that Josh would have inevitably been arrested instead of cited but for 
the cocaine’s discovery. The state failed to meet its burden to establish that Josh 
would have inevitably been arrested for the misdemeanors but for the cocaine’s 
unlawful discovery. This Court should vacate the order withholding judgment and 
remand to allow Josh to withdraw his guilty plea to the felony. 
 III.  CONCLUSION   
The district court erred in determining that the drug investigation was 
supported by reasonable suspicion and that the drug dog’s sniff did not unlawfully 
extend the stop. Even if the drug dog alert occurred during a lawful detention, the 
search of Josh’s person cannot be upheld as a search incident to an “inevitable” 
arrest. The district court erred in denying the motion to suppress and Josh 
respectfully asks this Court to vacate the Order Withholding Judgment. 
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Respectfully submitted this 9th day of September, 2016. 
FYFFE LAW 
  
       /s/                                                  
Robyn Fyffe      
      Attorney for Joshua Poppe 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Criminal Law Division of the Idaho Attorney General at ecf@ag.idaho.gov  
on September 9, 2016.  
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Robyn Fyffe 
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